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Abstract 
Despite the benefits of buyers and seller collaboration and hence relationships extolled in 
extensive studies, issues of relationship power inhibit implementation of collaborative and 
relational approaches, particularly in some parts of the retail Sector. Further, most research 
regards them as dyadic or focal relationships, or perhaps in a network context, and typically 
investigates them from a power-dependency perspective and within vertical supply 
integration. Little attention has considered the potential role of supply chain intermediaries, 
such as logistics service providers, in objectively and independently determining and 
managing the course of buyer-supplier collaboration and relations in a business-to-business 
context. This article appraises this potential role and its relevant opportunities in the power-
laden, contentious environment of the retail grocery sector. With an interdisciplinary 
approach, drawn from supply management, relationship management, and logistics and 
supply chain management, this article emphasises the importance of horizontal collaboration 
using fourth-party logistics structures, as horizontal intermediary conduits, who act 
independently between retailers and suppliers to facilitate collaborative and relational 
activity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Research into business-to-business relationships is not new. On the demand i.e. customer or 
buyer side, relationship management and relationship marketing have long provided principal 
theories for understanding dyadic, buyer–supplier relationships (e.g. Morgan & Hunt, 1994; 
Möller & Halinen, 2000; Lindgreen & Wynstra, 2005). The stream of such literature acts as 
an umbrella and covers a wide, interlinked set of issues such as interpersonal and inter-
organizational relations, power dependence, trust, and collaboration, in a downstream 
direction of travel from suppliers toward buyers (e.g. Frazier, 1983; Wilson, 1995; Jain, 
Khalil, Johnston & Cheung, 2013; Meehan & Wright, 2013). 
 There is also vast work on the supply i.e. supplier side, focusing on supplier 
assessment, collaboration, and segmentation (e.g. Kraljic, 1983; Ulaga & Eggert, 2006; 
Roseira, Brito & Henneberg, 2010). However, the reverse application of relationship 
management, i.e. from buyers to suppliers and key supply relationship development, remains 
largely lacking. One notable exception is a study by Lindgreen, Vanhamme, Van Raaij, & 
Johnston (2013) that develops a novel instrument to measure an organization’s use of 
transaction purchasing, electronic purchasing, interactive purchasing, and network 
purchasing. 
 However, there is evidence that relationships between buyers and suppliers do not 
often adhere to notions of good, collaborative relationship practices (Spekman, Kamauff & 
Myhr, 1998; Robson & Rawnsley, 2001; Hingley, Lindgreen, & Casswell, 2006). One 
notable example is the UK retail grocery sector, where retailers have been accused of using 
predatory practices with suppliers and exercising the power they achieved from suppliers 
during a transfer from the 1980s onwards (Grant, 2005; Hingley, 2005; Fernie & Grant, 
2008). 
 This work supports Cox (2004), who identified supply chain management or SCM 
as the most intensive resource, i.e. cost, requirement for buyers and suppliers, and that 
supplier development and SCM work best in situations where buyers have dominance or 
power over suppliers or where there is interdependence in the power relationships between 
them. And yet, distribution efficiencies in grocery retail have improved over the last 30 years, 
to the benefit of both retailers and suppliers (Frankel, Goldsby, & Whipple, 2002; Fernie & 
McKinnon, 2003; Fernie & Grant, 2008). 
 Many of these achievements have been predicated on the use of intermediaries such 
as logistics service providers, who provide transport and storage in food supply chains, to 
serve as objective, ‘honest brokers’ and do not wield power in distribution and relationship 
processes in order to maintain balance and fairness, as well as efficiency and effectiveness, in 
the grocery supply chain (Mukhopadhyay, 2006; Potter, Mason & Lalwani, 2006; Mason, 
Lalwani & Boughton, 2007). 
 Accordingly, we investigate in this paper the collaborative role and related practices 
of these intermediaries to enhance our understanding of reducing the influence of one-way 
power in buyer-supplier relationships in vertical supply chain structures, especially in the 
grocery retail sector. We believe our work contributes to the supply chain and buyer-supplier 
relationship literature by providing further explanation of dyadic and triadic relations, 
networks and the coordination of supply. We discuss the role of intermediaries as channel 
moderators, facilitators, and gatekeepers, and the characteristics and issues related to 
collaboration that arise from our investigation of retailers, suppliers, and intermediaries in the 
UK grocery retailing sector, and propose insights into how intermediaries known as fourth-
party logistics service providers (herein after termed 4PLs) might catalyse horizontal 
collaboration and serve as ‘honest brokers’ in buyer-supplier relationship development. We 
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then conclude with managerial implications, limitations of this paper, and suggestions for 
further research. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1. Relationship theory: Buyer and supplier perspectives 
Many relationship and network theorists have highlighted the importance of relationships in 
business network contexts (e.g. Anderson, Håkansson, & Johanson, 1994; Håkansson & 
Snehota, 1995; Becker, 2008), with the contention that individual organisations and dyadic 
relationships both contribute to networks of inter-relationships, built on trust and 
commitment, which in turn derives from shared values and information, mutual dependence, 
communication, and relationship benefits (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Wilson, 1995; Spekman et 
al., 1998; Lindgreen, 2003; Jain et al., 2013). 
From a buyer’s perspective, supplier selection criteria thus include the supplier’s 
internal integration, collaboration, trust, and commitment capabilities. They also focus on 
information sharing, performance on both product and financial levels, and the supplier’s 
ability to learn and grow with the buyer (Spekman et al., 1998; Liker & Choi, 2004; Samiee 
& Walters, 2006). A successful supplier strategy contains four basic operational dimensions: 
identifying, analyzing, selecting suitable strategies for, and developing operational-level 
capabilities to maintain profitable long-term relationships with key accounts (Ojasalo, 2001). 
These operational dimensions reflect some of the supplier-side selection criteria, reinforcing 
the notion of collaboration between the two sides in a buyer–supplier dyad. 
 
2.2. Power in buyer-supplier relationships 
Power in buyer-seller relationships has been defined as the potential or ability of one channel 
(or supply chain) member to influence decisions of another channel (or supply chain) 
member (Frazier, 1983; Kumaer, 2005; Meehan & Wright, 2013). The inappropriate or 
predatory use of power, i.e. where there is an adversarial relationship due to the unequal share 
of value appropriation in a relationship (Cox, 2004) leads to overall inefficiencies and 
ineffectiveness in supply chains. For example, buyers may insist on unreasonable delivery 
times and quantities or provide inaccurate forecasts (Grant & Torgersen) that lead to demand 
amplification of upstream orders versus actual sales, or the infamous ‘bullwhip effect’ (Lee, 
Padmanabhan & Whang, 1997). 
 An ideal where power is equally shared is found when both the buyer and the seller 
have a ‘cooperative orientation’ where there is social, long-term financial i.e. shared 
investment and confidential information exchange across the dyadic relationship between 
buyer and seller (Ojansivu, Alajoutsijärvi & Salo, 2013). However, while retailers have used 
their power over suppliers in some cases (Spekman et al., 1998; Grant, 2005), 
competitiveness in the UK grocery retail market has led some retailers but many suppliers 
and logistics service providers to consider how they can collaborate to keep costs down and 
retain a competitive advantage (Grant, Fernie, Trautrims & El-Adas, 2008). 
 
2.3. Supply chain collaboration and the retail grocery sector 
Fernie & Grant (2008) note there has been considerable change in the past 30 years in retail 
grocery supply chains, from supplier-led to retailer or buyer-led. In the early 1980s, grocery 
retailers shifted from direct store delivery to regionally controlled distribution centres; soon 
after unprecedented levels of efficiency began to emerge as retailers massively reduced their 
inventory levels and lead times. Further efficiencies and cost reductions occurred when 
retailers turned to logistics service providers to handle supply chain services for them on a 
dedicated basis. In the 1990s retailers moved away from product-specific warehousing to 
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
4 
 
multi-temperature composite warehousing and distribution, which further reduced supply 
chain inventory levels through just-in-time collaborative approaches such as efficient 
consumer response or pilot collaborative, planning, forecasting, and replenishment initiatives 
(Barratt, 2004). 
 The collaboration inherent in some of these approaches worked to enhance the 
innovation and performance of the collaborating firms (Soosay, Hyland, & Ferrer, 2008). But 
it also demanded a shift in culture, toward one that prioritised not just collaboration but also 
trust, mutuality, and information exchange, with senior management support and sufficient 
resources (Barratt, 2004; Lindgreen, Palmer, Wetzels, & Antioco, 2009). Conversely, 
managerial inertia and a focus on parochial, short-term results negatively affected 
performance and customer service, thus creating conflicts in the supply chain (Simatupang & 
Sridharan, 2002). Nor could collaborative frameworks based solely on marginal relationships 
deliver superior performance (Bailey & Evans, 2006). 
 Collaboration among supply chain partners also underlies more general supply chain 
management notions, including the overarching, total systems perspective that includes 
relationship management across network firms, purchasing, customer service, and cost 
control, all to attain total supply chain satisfaction (Mason et al., 2007). 
 
2.4. Vertical and horizontal collaboration 
In supply chains, collaboration can take two forms: vertical or horizontal (Barratt, 2004; 
Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002), though vertical collaboration among suppliers, 
intermediaries, and retailers is more common. Stephens and Wright (2002) and Hingley, 
Lindgreen, Grant, and Kane (2011) both found that food retailers express virtually no interest 
in wider, deeper, multiple-retailer horizontal collaborations because they fear the loss of their 
competitive advantage. And yet both forms of collaboration rely on the use of logistics 
service providers to operate effectively. 
 For example, Fernie and McKinnon (2003) argue that more efficient collaboration 
among suppliers would encourage greater collaboration among distributors and Mason et al. 
(2007) show how horizontal collaboration increases the flexibility firms have to combine and 
share capabilities, such as through centralization, Internet-based tracking systems, shared 
pallet networks, or regional and central distribution hubs. Thus the profusion of logistics 
service providers creates vast opportunities for collaboration across the supply chain, 
implying the promise of improved optimization (Whiteoak, 2004). Yet some authors also 
warn of precarious multi-party relationships with primary producers (e.g., Aastrup, Grant, & 
Bjerre, 2007; Grant, 2005; Hingley, 2005; Kumar, 2005; Robson & Rawnsley, 2001). 
According to Stephens (2006), collaboration is possible only if external factors, such as 
resource shortages, legislation, or social and environmental pressures, exert such a strong 
influence that retailers cannot control the situation. Stephens also concludes that horizontal 
collaboration is more likely if brokered by a third party. 
 While modern, global supply chains require a significant amount of vertical 
collaboration, genuine, two-way, interactive partnerships do not tend to occur naturally 
(Robson & Rawnsley, 2001). Collins and Burt (1999) assert that risk in vertical supply chains 
is asymmetric, so a broad retailing business is likely to survive the loss of a supplier, whereas 
the consequences for a supplier that loses a key retailer are much more serious. 
 
2.5. The role of the intermediary 
Further support for the foregoing view emerges from vertical chain initiatives such as 
category management, which moves more risk to a preferred supplier and away from the 
retailer (Allen, 2001).A preferred supplier takes responsibility for the entire supply chain in a 
particular product category and aims to maximise sales and profitability by adopting an end-
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consumer orientation. For its part, the retailer reduces the number of its suppliers and aims to 
guarantee consistency rather than rely on varying qualities and specifications from different 
suppliers engaged in continual renegotiations. But, critics of category management contend 
that it reinforces retailer power and control (Dapiran & Hogarth-Scott, 2003; Duffy, Fearne, 
& Hornibrook, 2003).  
 However, when responsibilities devolve, such that a preferred or nominated lead 
supplier dominates a group of products, the benefits can accrue for both suppliers and the 
retailer. Previous discussions of ‘channel captains’ (Fearne & Hughes, 1999) and ‘super-
middleman’ roles (Hingley, 2005) highlight the mutual benefits available through ‘partnered’ 
marketing, despite overall imbalances in power. Suppliers engaged in category management 
roles might actually enjoy positive empowerment (Hingley, 2005), with returns in the form of 
power and authority when intermediaries perform an enhanced role together with retailers. 
More generally though, the outcome as Hingley et al. (2006) reveal is that suppliers tend to 
accept asymmetrical power imbalances, in return for regular retailer business.  
What is apparent in the discussion of intermediaries’ roles in grocery supply chains 
and managing grocery sector relationships is that the intermediaries concerned (e.g., super 
middlemen, category leaders, and so forth) are primarily contract suppliers, and the key 
interface is the predominant dyadic and vertical structure between that supplier (and its wider 
lead-intermediary co-ordinated supply network) with the retailer. Despite identification of 
some benefits of regular and consistent business for suppliers as intermediaries, and thereby 
subsequent benefits in transaction cost reduction (Hingley, 2005), the emphasis primarily is 
still on (backward) channel determination from the retailer. Of under-explored interest is the 
role performed by logisticians and logistics service structures in facilitating intermediary 
roles. This perhaps may offer a fundamentally more ‘independent’ one than that operated by 
supplier-based intermediaries. 
 
3. Logistics service providers as enablers of collaboration 
 
Logistics service providers range from simple hired-transport arrangements to contracts with 
third-party logistics or fourth-party logistics (4PL) service providers. The use of third-party 
logistics service providers relates to the phenomena of outsourcing; firms rely on an 
outsourced logistics provider to manage the entire logistics process neutrally. Logistics 
outsourcing often involves various forms, including transportation, warehousing, forwarding, 
brokering, reverse logistics services, and information technology. 
 A 4PL provider offers an extension to the third-party logistics concept and differs in 
several ways (Win, 2008; Papadopoulou, Manthou & Vlachopoulou, 2013). First, the 4PL is 
often a separate entity, established as a joint venture or long-term contract between a primary 
buyer and one or more partners, though it also is possible for a major third-party logistics 
service provider to form a 4PL organisation within its existing structure. Second, the 4PL acts 
as a single interface between the buyer and multiple logistics service providers; ideally, it 
manages all aspects of the buyer’s supply chain. Third, the 4PL inherently aims to establish a 
comprehensive supply chain solution rather than just improve the efficiency of physical 
logistics operations, as a 3PL provider would. Thus, unlike 3PL service provision, 4PL 
combines process, technology, and management to provide added-value for the hiring firm 
(Mukhopadhyay, 2006; Win, 2008). 
 Furthermore, all parties in a 4PL arrangement contribute equity and distribution 
assets, such as systems capability, strategy development, and process reengineering skills. 
Physical distribution management staff from the buyer may relocate to the new firm, which 
represents a strategic rather than tactical partner and supply chain orchestrator. This new firm 
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uses its knowledge to manage and integrate the supply chain and turns to specialist providers 
of logistics services if it lacks a certain needed expertise or capacity. 
 In this sense, the nature of a 4PL is similar to a lead logistics partner that organises 
other third-party logistics partners to outsource logistics functions. However, because a 4PL 
combines a buyer’s in-house resources and capabilities with those of outside agencies, it 
controls the supply chain for the buyer. The 4PL also can take a lead role in creating value, 
such as by undertaking the assembly of finished goods on behalf of buyers. Most 4PL 
providers operate nearly virtually and do not own assets, unlike a 3PL. Instead, they make 
very intense use of technology and software to manage their outsourced and supply chain 
processes. According to Christopher (2010), such a joint venture likely contains four key 
components: systems architecture and integration skills; a supply chain control room; the 
ability to capture and utilize information and knowledge across the network; and access to 
best-of-breed asset providers. 
 Existing physical distribution networks operated by individual retailers already 
incorporate these components, which suggest minimal technical barriers. Electronic 
communication systems already link 3PL suppliers and retailers through the electronic data 
interchange that supports efficient consumer response techniques. In addition, the highly 
specific nature of assets involved in a joint venture should negate the likelihood of 
opportunistic behaviour (Bourlakis & Bourlakis, 2005). In an automotive industry setting, 
Dyer (1997) found that transaction costs fall when firms with high asset specificity enter 
partnerships. Major grocery retailers have honed such system innovations; car manufacturers 
even use processes perfected by retailers (Truss, Wu, Saroop, & Sehgal, 2006).  
 Because 4PLs produce efficiency, effectiveness, and better economic performance 
(i.e., profitability), they might further encourage collaboration among retail buyers. That is, 
4PLs offer independent and objective execution of logistics and supply chain activities which 
establishes them as ‘honest brokers’ in relation to individual buyers or customers. 
Accordingly, 4PLs might overcome a major stumbling block to collaboration, namely, 
retailers’ willingness to engage in such joint ventures (Grant et al., 2008; Hingley et al., 
2011), due to parochialism, inter-firm conflicts, or competing interests. Scepticism, however, 
remains high (Grant et al., 2008; Hingley et al., 2011) despite the widespread application of 
some vertical collaboration between retailers and suppliers in mature grocery supply chain 
systems, retailers continue to resist deeper vertical collaboration, as well as horizontal and 
network integration. 
 This resistance may reflect a lack of ability, interest, or determination, or perhaps it 
simply implies that powerful retailers in a gatekeeper role block collaboration to protect their 
own self-interest. Notwithstanding, there are some recent examples where collaborative 
efforts are providing dividends for smaller suppliers of fresh produce (Hingley, Lindgreen & 
Beverland, 2010; Hingley, 2011) and local food suppliers of regional products (Hingley, 
2010); these products are finding more favour with consumers after recent food security and 
safety issues. 
 Regardless of the reasons for the aforementioned resistance, we contend it is time to 
change current physical distribution management structures associated with grocery and 
wider retail supply chains. In particular, a recent study of supplier–retailer–logistics service 
provider relationships indicates the potential for increased asset utilization and the 
marketability of a more environmentally sound approach to physical distribution management 
(Hingley et al., 2011). These findings resonate with findings regarding the benefits of 
innovation and collaboration in retail supply chains (Bailey & Evans; 2006; Barratt, 2004; 
Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). 
 Retailer reticence likely relates to power or control issues (Spekman et al., 1998; 
Grant, 2005; Hingley, 2005; Kumar, 2005), which exert detrimental effects on the retailer-
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supplier dynamic. Retailers have reached their current positions through significant 
horizontal mergers and acquisitions rather than friendly collaboration; they also may have 
reached a point of saturation, especially when legislation aims to ensure competitive markets 
(Competition Commission, 2000) and activists make claims for consumer welfare (Blythman, 
2007; Simms, 2007). 
 Finally, better physical distribution management can offer far more to retailers than 
efficiencies and effectiveness (Grant, 2005; Hingley et al., 2011). Grocery retailers value 
service levels and jealously guard sensitive sales information, so it is difficult to envisage any 
situation in which they would collaborate so much that they shared physical distribution 
management with suppliers. Such gatekeepers and their channel captains may be motivated 
more by safeguards against competition than by collaborative savings; as Hingley et al. 
(2010) show, powerful channel members can ‘block’ collaborative activity by suppliers to 
maintain their status quo supply arrangements and thereby retain more channel power and 
control.  
 To allay these concerns, retailers might implement collaboration, and by extension 
appropriate and improve their supplier relationships, by using a 4PL that acts as an ‘honest 
broker’ and mediates the relationship with suppliers. Retail buyers first would need to 
consider what type of LSP engagement they need; the typology in Figure 1 (based on work 
regarding strategic suppliers by Kaufman, Wood, & Theryel, 2000; Hingley et al., 2011) 
denotes how collaboration may be considered in terms of axes of intensity (or level) of 
collaboration and complexity (or level) of collaborative distribution. 
 
 
Figure 1: Proposed typology for logistics service provider collaboration  
Adapted from Kaufman et al. (2000) and Hingley et al. (2011) 
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 In this context, the intensity of collaboration means that from low to high the 
number and type of relationships become more intense, i.e. the logistics service provider is 
required to become more involved in the retailer’s physical distribution management 
operations and becomes an ‘order maker’ as opposed to and ‘order taker’ (Holter, Grant, 
Ritchie, Shaw & Towers, 2010). The complexity of collaborative distribution means that 
from low to high the relationship between the logistics service provider and the retailer 
becomes deeper due to the increased complexity of the physical distribution management 
network or supply chain (Grant et al., 2018). 
 At low levels of complexity and collaboration intensity, implying a less mature 
supply chain, a transactional third-party logistics service provider relationship (denoted 3PL 
in the figure) may suffice. This type of relationship, i.e. a Type 1, is transactional in nature 
and akin to Cox’s (2004) non-adversarial arms-length relationship where the current market 
price and contractual transactions prevail. If distribution complexity increases, a relational 
3PL arrangement may be more appropriate. This Type 2 relationship is akin to Cox’s (2004) 
non-adversarial arms-length relationship where there is a transparent operational manner with 
long-term relationship commitments. However, if there is high intensity, such as in a mature 
supply chain, a complete 4PL arrangement may be appropriate, whether the 4PL provides 
physical distribution management on an arm’s-length basis for the buyer and solves problems 
in a minimally collaborative distribution environment (Type 3) or becomes a specialist or 
consultant (Type 4). These two types of relationships go beyond Cox’s (2004) model and 
represent two new styles of a triadic relationship wherein the 4PL works primarily with the 
retailer but provides significant value-added services by acting as a ‘channel captain’ (Fearne 
& Hughes, 1999) for the retailer’s other logistics service providers and suppliers. Thus, this 
adapted typology in Figure 1 offers a useful methodological process for all logistics service 
providers, whether third-party only or 4PL. 
 Further, we also present in Figure 2 a model for structuring a physical distribution 
management system with logistics service providers in a grocery retail supply chain, based on 
Hingley’s (2005) concept of supplier super-middlemen. In this case the logistics service 
provider collaborates with three retailers (X, Y, and Z) and manages the physical distribution 
management with three types of suppliers: overseas suppliers, primary producers in the home 
country, and specialist or local producers, thereby progressing this model as one which 
represents a more independent and interdependent intermediary role based around logistics 
service providers, rather than solely suppliers. 
 
 In practice logistics service providers provide basic, low-intensity collaborative 
services, such as transport, storage, and breaking bulk loads or consolidating loads to send to 
retailer regional distribution centres, especially from primary suppliers in the home country, 
on a Type 1 basis. They also might attend to activities such sourcing and qualifying suppliers, 
particularly overseas suppliers, through the auspices of the British Retail Consortium Global 
Standards for food, packing and materials, and storage and distribution (BRC, 2011), which 
implies a Type 2 or 3 basis. Finally, Figure 2 shows that logistics service providers could 
coordinate direct deliveries from overseas suppliers to regional distribution centres for 
retailers X and Y, for products such as fresh produce that do not need to be processed by the 
logistics service provider and are time-sensitive or perishable. Supply could also follow a 
Type 4 approach for smaller, local suppliers of regional products for retailer Z; as issues of 
local supply have become highly relevant in response to quality and environmental concerns 
(Hingley, 2011), and a counter-trend to national and globalized supply. 
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Figure 2: Domain of a logistics service provider acting as intermediary 
Adapted from Hingley (2005) 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
We turned to studies in the areas of supply, relationship, and supply chain management for a 
good foundation for our investigation of the relatively under-researched concept of 
collaboration and relational activity in UK retail grocery supply chains. Relationships 
embedded in organizational structures associated with powerful retailer-endorsed 
intermediaries (whether they serve as preferred suppliers, category leaders, ‘channel captains’ 
or super-middlemen) have been investigated previously, with a focus primarily on the dyadic 
interface between supplier or intermediary and the retailer via predominantly vertical co-
ordination. The horizontal channel element of these structures is less understood, relegated to 
the will of powerful retail buyers. Many such so-called partnering (power-imbalanced) 
arrangements can deliver an enhanced return to suppliers, but the structures remain resolutely 
backwardly vertically controlled, with a dyadic interface. Hence, we know considerably less 
about collaborative and relational implications in a retail supply chain context.  
 We identified in this article a special opportunity for collaboration to enable this 
activity in the retail grocery sector; that is, logistics service providers engaged by the retailers 
or buyers can be an intermediary to link with suppliers. The intermediary role in category 
management or super-middleman scenarios is tempered by the retailer’s vertical control, but 
a fourth-party logistics service provider is an ‘honest broker’ and thus offers a framework for 
co-ordination that is less dominated by channel and network power plays. 
 The success of this arrangement depends on the influences of supply chain costs and 
whether retailers are prepared to place the co-ordination of their logistical relationships in the 
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hands of overarching logistics service providers, as in the 4PL scenarios, to save on those 
costs. The trigger point arises with the rapidly increasing costs for logistics and relationship 
management, creating the argument for shared supply chain resources. It is an even more 
likely prospect in an age of rising energy and associated costs to move goods globally. 
However, caution is necessary when considering the real possibility of channel power plays 
and blockades of chain and network structural innovations by powerful members who wish to 
retain authority and control. Still, the distinct possibility of added relationship value, along 
with cost reduction benefits from shared resources, indicates the promise of a successful 
relationship outcome from horizontal supply chain structures.  
 
5. Managerial implications, limitations, and suggestions for further research 
 
Horizontal collaborative structures have been under-researched while dyadic relationships 
and vertical co-ordination have dominated theory and practice. Thus, we call for ongoing 
practical development of the horizontal dimension of chain and network relationships through 
logistics service providers that play coordinating roles with retailers, perhaps in 4PL 
arrangements. 
There are several benefits to both retailers and supplier sin doing so. One is that the 
intermediaries as ‘honest brokers’ can help ensure quality standards are met and maintained 
in complex food supply chains that are under pressure to reduce costs, particularly in the 
public or catering sectors. Recent issues regarding sub-standard or poor quality food finding 
its way into the food supply chain and being sold at retailers due to complex supply chains 
and indeterminate suppliers in some cases. Another benefit is that an ‘honest broker’ 
intermediary can provide a holistic view of the retail supply chain from retailer or buyer 
through tier 1 and possibly tier 2 suppliers in order to enable effective and efficient supply 
chain activities to reduce costs. 
As with all articles there are limitations. This article is primarily conceptual but 
derives the frameworks presented herein from the few previous empirical studies that have 
been conducted. Further empirical investigations should be undertaken in the retail grocery 
sector as well as and wider sectoral contexts to validate or refute our notions and/or 
frameworks. Having said that, we consider grocery supply collaboration and relationships are 
typical of other sectors, featuring common issues of communication, relationship 
coordination, power dependence, and so forth. Finally, it would be helpful to explore the 
boundaries of the trade-off that retailers (or other predominant chain and network power 
brokers) make between the advantages of horizontal coordination (relationships, shared 
facility cost savings) and their existing desire for vertically coordinated control. 
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